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CASTELLAIN v. PRESTON.
After the date of a contract for the sale of a house which was insured against fire,
and before completion of the purchase, the house was damaged by fire, and the insur-
ance company, in ignorance of the contract, paid the vendors for the damage done.
The purchase was subsequently completed, the vendors receiving the full amount of
the purchase-money, and also retaining the moneys paid to them by the insurance
company. In an action by the chairman of the insurance company against the ven-
dors to recover the amount paid by the company to them: Held (reversing the
judgment of CHITTY, J.), that the contract of insurance was a contract of indem-
nity only, and therefore the receipt of the purchase-money by the defendants must
be taken into account in calculating the amount of the loss sustained by the defend-
ant, and as it had the effect of extinguishing such loss, the plaintiff was entitled to
recover.
THIS was an action brought by the chairman of the Liverpool
and London and Globe Insurance Company against the defendants
to recover the sum of 3301., together with interest thereon from the
25th September 1878; or, in the alternative, for a declaration that
the defendants were trustees for the plaintiff of the same sum and
interest, under the following circumstances:
On the 31st July 1878, the defendants entered into a contract
with Messrs. Rayner for the sale to them of a house and premises
in Liverpool for the sum of 31001.
At the date of the contract the house was insured against fire, by
the defendants, with the Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance
Company, but no mention of the insurance was made in the
contract.
After the date of the contract, but before the completion of the
purchase, the house was damaged by fire to the extent of 3301.,
which sum was paid to the defendants by the insurance company,
who at that time were not aware of the contract for the sale of the
premises.
As the defendants refused to hand over the 3301. to the pur-
chasers, or to allow that sum to be deducted from the purchase-
money, or to expend it in reinstating the premises, the purchasers
brought an action against the vendors for a declaration that they
were entitled to the benefit of the moneys received by the defend-
ants from the insurance company, and to have the same paid or
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allowed to them accordingly, or otherwise to have the money laid
out towards reinstating the premises; but that action was dismissed
with costs by JESSEL, M. R., and his decision °was affirmed on
appeal: Rayner v. Preston, 14 Ch. Div. 297; s. c. on appeal, 18
Ch. Div. 1.
This action was then brought, and was entered fbr trial at the
Liverpool Assizes in January 1882, but, upon being opened before
CHITTY, J., the jury were discharged,'and the action was adjourned
for further consideration.
After hearing the argument, on further consideration, CHITTY, J.,
gave judgment for the defendants, and from this judgment, which
is reported L. R., 8 Q. B. Div. 613, the plaintiff now appeals.
The appeal was argued by C. Russell, Q. C., and Tobin, for the
plaintiff; and by Gully, Q.. C., and W. B. Kenvedy, for the
defendants.
BRETT, L. J.-In this case an action was brought by the plain-
tiff as representative of the Liverpool and London and Globe
Insurance Company, in respect of certain money which had been
paid to thedefendants on account of damage done to a building by
fire. ' The defendants were the owners of the property so damaged,
and they had made a contract for the sale of it to third persons, which
contract, on the giving of certain notice as to time of payment,
would oblige those third persons to pay the agreed price. The ven-
dees would have to pay the price whether the house were burned or
not. After the making of the contract and before the day of pay-
ment the house was burned. It was insured by the defendants with
the insurance company which the plaintiff represents, and it could
not be suggested that the defendants had no insurable interest; for,
in the first place, they were the legal owners of the property ; and,
secondly, the vendees might never carry out the contract, and the
vendors, the defendants, would then suffer the loss. The defend-
ants made a claim upon the insurance company, and were paid the
amount of the damage occasioned by the fire. After that the con-
tract of sale was carried out, and the full price paid to the defend-
ants, notwithstanding the fire. The plaintiff now sues the de-
fendants, not, properly speaking, to recover back the money actually
paid to the defendants, but in respect of the money so paid, claiming
that the insurance company is entitled to have the benefit of that
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money. The question to be decided is, can he recover? The case
was tried before CHITTY, J., and he has come to the conclusion that
the plaintiff cannot recover. It seems to me that the foundation
of his judgment is this: He does'not consider that the doctrine of
subrogation can be applied to the present case. What we have to
consider is, do we agree with this view or not? In order to give
my opinion on this question I feel obliged to revert to what is the
foundation of every rule with regard to insurance law, which is
this: Every contract of marine or fire insurance is a contract of
indemnity, and of indemnity only, the meaning of which is that the
assured in case of a loss is to receive a full indemnity, but is never
to receive more. Every rule of insurance law is adopted in order
to carry out this fundamental rule, and if ever any proposition is
brought forward the effect of which is opposed to this fundamental
rule, it will be found to be wrong. There are many propositions
bearing on the question, and many rules may be glanced at which
are well-known in insurance law. The doctrine in marine insur-
ance law of constructive total loss is adopted solely in order to carry
out the fundamental rule. It is a doctrine which is in favor of the
assured, because where the loss is not an actual total loss, but is
what, as a matter of business, is treated as equivalent to j total loss,
this rule is adopted to carry out the fundamental doctrine and give
the assured a full indemnity. Grafted on that doctrine came the
doctrine of abandonment, which is only applicable to cases of con-
structive total loss, and is introduced in favor of the underwriters,
so that they may have to pay no more than an indemnity. So it
appears that these two doctrines were introduced in order to carry
out the two limits of the fundamental doctrine to which I have
referred, namely, that the assured shall get a full indemnity, and
that he shall get no more. As I stated in the course of the argu-
ment, the doctrine as to notice of abandonment seems more difficult
to support in principle than the other rules of insurance law. It
was introduced in favor of the underwriters, in order that they
might not by means of any fraud be obliged to pay more than a full
indemnity. It is a technical doctrine, because, if there was no
notice of abandonment, although there was a constructive total loss,
the assured did not recover for the loss. Probably the rule was
originally adopted by merchants for the purpose of carrying on bus-
iness, for otherwise it seems to me that the introduction of it by
the courts would be an encroachment. The doctrine of subrogation
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is another proposition which has been introduced in order to carry
out the fundamental rule. It was introduced in favor of the under-
writers in order to prevent their having to pay more than a full
indemnity, not on the ground that the underwriters were sureties,
for they are not so always, although their rights are sometimes
similar to those of sureties, but in order to prevent the assured
recovering more than a full indemnity. The question is whether
the doctrine as applied in insurance law can be limited. Can
it be limited to putting the underwriters in the place of the assured
in order to enable them to enforce a dontract or a right of action ?
Why should we limit it to this, if the effect of so doing would be to
entitle the assured to more than a full indemnity ? That is the
fault of the judgment of GHiTTY, J., in the court below; it is lim-
ited to the enforcement of a right of action. In order to apply
the doctrine properly we must go into the full meaning of subroga-
tion, which is the placing of the assurer in the position of the as-
sured. In order fully to carry out the fundamental principle we
must carry the doctrine of subrogation so far as to say that, as
between the underwriter and the assured, the underwriter is entitled
to every right, whether of contract fulfilled or unfulfilled, or in tort,
enforced or capable of being enforced, or to any other right, legal
or equitable, which has accrued to the assured, w'hereby the loss can
be or has been diminished. That is the largest form in which I
can put the rule. I use the words "1 every right" because I think
the doctrine requires to be carried to that extent. I think the
decision in Burnand v. Rodocanachi, 7 App. Cas. 333, went on
this foundation. In that case what was paid by the American gov-
ernment was not salvage, but a gift, and the persons who received
the money so paid had no right to it until it had actually come
into their hands. I am aware that the cases as to reprisals (Randal
v. Cockran, 1 Yes. Sr. 98, and Blaauwpot v. Da Costa, I Eden
130) have been stated to be cases of a gift, but it seems to me
that they came within the same rule of law, because, although there
was no obligation to make the payment, the government always
made it so that as a matter of business it came to be considered as
a right. This shows that the doctrine goes much further than to
extend only to what could have given a cause of action. Where
the contract has been fulfilled the right of action is gone. Again,
take the case of a tort feasor, who makes good the damage occa-
sioned by his tort; there again the right of action is gone, and
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there is no right of action into which the insurer can be aubrogated;
but the insurer could not be subrogated until he had paid the loss,
and therefore to confine the doctrine as suggested would take out
innumerable cases. If the right exists in the assured, although
there may never be a right of action, it seems contrary to the fun-
damental doctrine to say that the loss is not to be diminished. For
myself I cannot see why, if the defendants would have had a right
against a third party to enforce the contract of sale, the insurers
should not have been subrogated into that right; but COTTON, L. J.,
is not satisfied as to this, so I will pass by the question, which it
is unnecessary to decide, because here there was a right to have the
contract fulfilled by the third party, and the assured has received
from the third party the money payable under that contract. I
cannot conceive any right by which the assured has his loss dimin-
ished, which would be other than a right affecting the loss. In
the present case the right affects the loss, enabling the assured to
get the same money which he would have got notwithstanding the
loss. The present case is the case of a contract relating to real
property, and therefore is somewhat peculiar in its nature. We are
asked to say that where the contract is that a person will pay if
the property is lost, that is to be brought into the account, but
where it is to pay though the property is lost, that is not to be
brought in. I cannot see that it rests on so fine a distinction. In
the course of his judgment, in the court below, CHITTY, J., says,
(8 Q. B. Div., at p. 617): "I know of no foundation for the right
of underwriters, except the well-known principle of law, that where
one person has agreed to indemnify another he will, on making good
the indemnity, be entitled to succeed to all the ways and means by
which the person indemnified might have protected himself against,
or reimbursed himself for, the loss." This passage is quoted from
the judgment of Lord OAIRNS, in Simpson v. Thompson, 8 App.
Cas. 284. Then CHITTY, J., goes on: "What is the principle of
subrogation ? On payment, the insurers are entitled to enforce all
the remedies, whether in contract or in tort, which the insured has
against third parties, whereby the insured can compel such third
parties to make good the loss insured against.", It seems to me
that he is there confining the pripiciple of subrogation to rights
which the insured is entitled to enforce; that is to say, that he is
confining it to the remedies of the insured. Then be goes on and
gives instances: "Where the owner of a building insures, and the
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building isv destroyed by a riot, the insurers, on payment, are sub-
rogated to their right against the hundred. Where the landlord
insures, and he has a covenant by the tenant to repair, the insur-
ance office, on payment, in like manner succeeds to the right of
the landlord against the tenant," &c. I would add that if the
tenant repairs the insurer is entitled to receive from the insured
a benefit equivalent to that derived by the insured from such
repairs. Dealing with Burnand v. Bodocanacki, 6 Q. B. Div.
633, 7 App. Oas. 333, he says: "There the underwriters, under a
valued policy on the ship, which was destroyed by the Alabama, a
cruiser, paid as on a total loss. The American government, under
a treaty with the British government,'provided a fund out of which
the insured received a sum in respect of the destruction of the
ship, and the question was whether that sum was part of the sal-
vage. That point was put very clearly by BRAMWELL, L. J., in
his judgment, and it was held that it was not; that in the circum-
stances the sum received by the shipowner was but a pure gift,
and there was no right on the part of the insurers to recover any
part of it over against him." I would add to that-because there
was no right in the assured to receive the money from the Amer-
ican government, but their payment to him was a pure gift. The
decision in Darrell v. Tibbitts, 5 Q. B. Div. 560, is in favor of the.
plaintiff in the present case. I shall not retract what I there
said. In Darrell v. Tibbitts, the insurers were not subrogated into
a right of action or a remedy, but into the advantage of the rem-
edy which had been applied, whether it had been enforced or vol-
untarily administered by the person bound to administer it. I said
there: "The doctrine is well established that where something is
insured against loss either in a marine or a fire policy, after the
assured has been paid by the insurers for the loss, the insurers
are put into the place of the assured with regard to every right
given to him by the law respecting the subject-matter insured :"
5 Q. B. Div. 563. That is one sentence, and is complete in itself,
and so I intended it to be; then the same judgment continues,
"and with regard to every contract which touches the subject-
matter insured, and which contract is affected by the loss or the
safety of the subject-matter insured by reason of the peril insured
against." I fail to conceive any contract which gives a right which
is not affected by the loss or the safety of the subject-matter in-
sured. If it is necessary to bring this payment within those terms
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I am of opinion that here the contract is affected because the
money is paid in consequence of the contract. In his judgment
in the court below, CHITTY, J., observes, "that the only principle
applicable is that of subrogaion, as understood in the full sense of
that term, and that where the right claimed is under a contract
between the insured and third parties, it must be confined to the
case of a contract relating to the subject-matter of the insurance
which entitled the insurers to have the damages made good :" 8
Q. B. Div. 625. I think it would be better to say, "which enti-
tled the insured to be put by such third parties in as good a
position as if the damage had not happened." The contract in
the present case does enable the insured to be put in such a position,
and this arises from the contract alone. For these reasons it seems
to me that, according to the true principle of insurance law, and
carrying out the fundamental doctrine that a policy is a contract
of indemnity and no more, the plaintiff must succeed. I am of
opinion that the plaintiff in the present case is entitled to recover,
and the jugment appealed from must be reversed.
A previous action arising out of the
same state of facts hqd, prior to the
principal case, been brought by the pur-
chaser of the house rgainst the vendor to
recover the insurance money received by
the latter, and had been decided against
the purchaser. See a report of the case
with a note, 21 Am. Law Reg., N. S.
89 (Rayner v. Preston).
It will be seen that the two decisions,
though relating to the same transaction,
are based on different grounds. In the
first (Rayner v. Preston), as stated by
BRETT, L. J., in his opinion : " There
was no sort of relation of any kind be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant
with regard to the policy, and therefore
none with regard to any money received
under the policy." JAtEs, L. J., how-
ever, dissented, preferring to rest his
judgment on the fact that " the relation
between the vendor and the purchaser, be-
came, and was in law, as from the date
of the contract and up to the completion
of it, the relation of trustee and cestui
que trust, and that the trustee received
the insurance money by reason of and as
the actual amount of the damage done to
the trust property, * * * and that the
money reached the vendor's hands ac-
cording to the then rights of the parties
as between them and the insurance
office; that is to say, as money which
ought to be laid out in reinstating the
premises, or, in other words, as money
which the purchaser alone had any real
or substantial interest in."
The principal case, in deciding which
the court was unanimous, rested upon
the ground of insurance law, as be-
tween the insured and the insurer, viz.,
that a policy is a contract of indemnity
and no more, and the receipt of the pur-
chase-money by the defendants must be
taken into account in calculating the
amount of -the loss sustained by them,
and as BowEx, L. J., observes, "a
policy of insurance is a contract of in-
demnity, and no more can be recovered
than the amount of the loss.sustained,"
and here the receipt of the purchase-
money had the effect of extinguish-
ing such loss. Mr. Justice CHITTY did
not appear to think that the doctrine of
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subrogation was applicable to the case.
The fundamental law, as stated by
BRETT, L. J., is that "every contract
of insurance, marine or fire, is a con-
tract of indemnity, and of indemnity
only, the meaning of which is that the
insured, in case of a loss, is to receive a
full indemnity, but is never to receive
more."
BowEN, L. J., in giving his judgment
in the principal case, commented on the
words used by JAus, L. J., in Raynerv.
PZreston, supra, where he said: "The Act
of Parliament as to fire insurance (14
Geo. 3, c. 75), seems to me to show that
a policy of insurance on a house was con-
sidered by the legislature, as I believe it
to be considered by the universal con-
sciences of mankind, to be a policy for
the benefit of all persons interested in
the property, and it appears to me that
a purchaser having an equitable interest
under a contract of sale is a person
having an interest within the mean-
ing of the act. I believe that there
is no case to be found in which the
liability of the insurance office has been
limited to the value of the interest of
the insured in the house destroyed. If a
tenant for life, having insured his house,
has the house destroyed or damaged by
fire, I have never heard it suggested that
the insurance office could cut down his
claim by showing that he was of extreme
old age, or suffering from a mortal dis-
ease." "I wish," said Bowne, L.
J., "to speak with the highest respect
and reverence in commenting on any-
thing said by so great a judge, but I
confess I cannot follow those observa-
tions. It is true that in practice insur-
ance offices do not take the trouble to
inquire as to interest of persons propo-
sing to insure; but the reason is that
generally the policy is intended to cover
all interest, and also there are usually
covenants to repair, so that there no
question can arise. Suppose a weekly
tenant insures, only meaning to cover
his own interest, could he recover the
full value of the house ? It is true that
the insurer cannot satisfy the claim
upon him by handing over to the injured
tenant marketable value of his term;
but the reason for that is that the in-
sured loses more. That is all that is
meant by WooD, V. C., in Simpson v.
The Scottish Union Ins. Co., 1 H. & M.
618."" His' lordship then as to the
case of a life tenant, upon the hypothesis
that he is a very old man, and assuming
that he meant to insure only his own
interests, says : "If he insures intend-
ing to insure his own interest only, and
he dies a week after the fire, I doubt
'whether the court would give the full
value of the house to his representatives.
In such case we must go back to the broad
principle. Here the case is one of vendor
and vendee, and Rayner v. 1+eston was
decided on the ground that the vendors
were not trustees for the purchasers of
the money secured by the policy. What
then is the insurable interest of the
vendor which entitles him in the first
instance to receive the money? It is
the beneficial interet of an unpaid vendor
who has agreed to sell the property, but
still retains the legal estate, and has not
received the price. In the first instance
he can obviously recover on the policy,
as was decided in Collingridge v. The
Royal .Exchange Assurance Corporation,
3 Q. B. Div. 173. Then can he keep
the whole of the insurance money,
having only lost a part, say a half, of
what he has insured ? In Simpson v.
Thomson, 3 App. Cases 284, Lord
Cnss said: I I know of no founda-
tion for the right of underwriters, ex-
cept the well known principle of law
that where one person has agreed to
indemnify another, lie will, on making
good the indemnity, be entitled to suc-
ceed to all the ways and means by which
the person indemnified might have pro-
tected himself against or reimbursed him-
self for the loss. Now is there any distine-
tion here on the ground that the present
case is one of fire, while that was one of
